Quantitative Models of Imperfect Deception in Network Security using
  Signaling Games with Evidence by Pawlick, Jeffrey & Zhu, Quanyan
Quantitative Models of Imperfect Deception in
Network Security using Signaling Games with
Evidence [IEEE CNS 17 Poster]
Jeffrey Pawlick and Quanyan Zhu
Abstract—Deception plays a critical role in many interactions
in communication and network security. Game-theoretic models
called “cheap talk signaling games” capture the dynamic and
information asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions. But
signaling games inherently model undetectable deception. In this
paper, we investigate a model of signaling games in which the
receiver can detect deception with some probability. This model
nests traditional signaling games and complete information Stack-
elberg games as special cases. We present the pure strategy perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibria of the game. Then we illustrate these
analytical results with an application to active network defense.
The presence of evidence forces majority-truthful behavior and
eliminates some pure strategy equilibria. It always benefits the
deceived player, but surprisingly sometimes also benefits the
deceiving player.
I. INTRODUCTION
Advanced cyberattackers employ deception to evade signa-
ture detection, release misleading information, and frustrate
attempts at attribution. Deceptive opinion spam [5] and identity
deception in social networks [9] are two examples. Decep-
tion can also be used in active cyber defense to manipulate
the beliefs of an adversary [8], leveraging the advantage of
information-asymmetry typically enjoyed by attackers (Fig. 1).
Quantitative metrics are needed to optimally deploy defen-
sive deception and optimally detect and mitigate malicious
deception. These metrics would also allow policymakers, en-
trepreneurs, and cyber-insurance vendors to assess the influence
of new legislation, technology, or risk mitigation strategies.
Game theory provides a set of tools to make quantitative,
verifiable predictions about the outcome of the strategic and
decentralized decisions characteristic of network security. In
particular, cheap talk signaling games [1] capture the dynamic
and information-asymmetric nature of deceptive interactions.
These games are two-player, dynamic, information asymmetric
games. The players are a sender (S) and a receiver (R), which
correspond to the party which may attempt deception and the
party which may be deceived, respectively.
Cheap talk signaling games are often used to model de-
ception in cybersecurity. But these games inherently model
deception which is undetectable1. Of course, both security
1In some signaling games, equilibrium conditions allow the message to
convey the true private information. But there is no exogenous constraint on
deception, i.e., it is just as easy for the sender to lie as it is for him to reveal
the truth.
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Figure 1. An example of defensive deception. The left side shows the
real network and the right side shows the deceptive network. A honeynet is
disguised as a set of sensors and a controller in order to manipulate attacker
movements. This interaction can be modeled by signaling games with evidence.
R: 𝜎𝑅 𝑎 𝑚, 𝑒 )S: 𝜎𝑆 𝑚 𝜃)
D: 𝜆 𝑒 𝜃,𝑚)
type 𝜃 message 𝑚 action 𝑎
∈ {0,1} ∈ {0,1} ∈ {0,1}
evidence 𝑒
∈ {0,1}
Figure 2. In signaling games with evidence, R chooses action a with a
probability that depends on evidence e emitted by the detector D in addition
to message m.
administrators and cybercriminals invest heavily in detecting
deception. Examples include detection of false opinion spam
[5], malicious logins [7], and social network identity deception
[9]. Therefore, we extend cheap-talk signaling games to capture
the possibility of detecting deception.
II. MODEL
Figure 2 depicts the traditional signaling game between S
and R, augmented by a detector block (D). We can call this
augmented signaling game a signaling game with evidence [6].
Our contribution is to add block D, which denotes a detector
that emits evidence e ∈ E = {0,1} with probability λ (e | θ,m) .
The detector classifies the message as suspicious (e = 1) or not
suspicious (e = 0). Two examples of detectors are email clients
which warn users about possible phishing emails and browser
warnings which alert users if websites do not have verifiable
website security certificates. Let β ∈ [1/2,1] and α ∈ [0,1/2]
denote the power and size of the detector, respectively. R uses
both the message m and the evidence e to form belief µ(θ |m, e)
about the likelihood that S has type θ.
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Table I
PURE POOLING PBNE WHEN β > 1−α
Prior Probabilities Sender w/o Evidence Sender w/ Evidence
0-Dominant Reveal or deceive Reveal or deceive
0-Majority Reveal or deceive Majority reveal
Mixed Reveal or deceive No Eq.
1-Majority Reveal or deceive Majority reveal
1-Dominant Reveal or deceive Reveal or deceive
III. ANALYTICAL RESULTS AND APPLICATION
Theorem 1 states the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria
(PBNE) [3] of the game. Remark 1 and Remark 2 discuss
important properties of the PBNE, especially focusing on the
ways in which signaling games with evidence differ from
traditional signaling games.
Theorem 1. Table I summarizes the pure strategy PBNE 2.
Remark 1. Without evidence, it is equivalent for S to always
reveal the truth or to always lie. One effect of evidence is to
force majority-truthful signaling. In the 0-Majority regime,
S of type 0 reveal truthfully and S of (the minority) type 1
deceive. The opposite occurs in the 1-Majority regime.
Remark 2. In the Mixed prior probability regime, the evidence
eliminates all PBNE by playing a dominant role. Here R trusts
S if e = 0 and does not trust S if e = 1. It can be shown that S
and R can never mutually counter each other’s strategies.
Now consider an application in which a network admin-
istrator S is defending a network from an attacker R by
camouflaging normal systems as honeypots or honeypots as
normal systems. Let θ = 0 and θ = 1 denote normal systems
and honeypots, respectively. Let m = 0 and m = 1 denote
camouflaging (or revealing) a system as a normal system
or a honeypot. But this camouflage is not perfect, because
the attacker can try to detect honeypots through tests such
as measuring the execution time of control-modifying CPU
instructions [2]. This produces evidence e = 1 for a suspicious
system (i.e., one in which it is likely that m , θ), and e = 0 for
a system which is not suspicious. R uses this to decide whether
to move into the system or to withdraw.
Figures 3-4 use Gambit [4] to illustrate the results. Evidence
always improves the expected utility of the attacker R. He
always benefits from being able to detect honeypots. Interest-
ingly, the defender S also sometimes benefits from evidence,
as illustrated by Fig. 4. This implies that she sometimes wants
to imperfectly obscure the network characterization.
IV. CONCLUSION
Traditional signaling games model deception which is im-
possible to detect. We have introduced signaling games with
evidence, which allow an exogenous probability of detecting
deception. Evidence forces majority-truthful behavior in some
2Algebraic quantities for strategies and beliefs on and off the equilibrium
path, as well as results when β < 1−α, have also been obtained but are not
presented here due to space limitations.
Figure 3. Expected utility for the attacker as a function of the fraction p (0)
of normal systems in the network.
Figure 4. Expected utility for the defender as a function of the fraction p (0)
of normal systems in the network.
parameter regimes. It also eliminates all pure strategy equilibria
in others. The capability to collect evidence is always beneficial
for the uniformed player. Surprisingly, detection is sometimes
advantageous to the deceiver. We have illustrated an application
to network defense using honeypots, but our model applies to
any active cybersecurity defense which imperfectly leverages
information asymmetry.
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